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Federalization in Information Privacy Law
A B S T R A C T. In Preemption and Privacy, Professor Paul Schwartz argues that it would be
unwise for Congress to adopt a unitary federal information privacy statute that both eliminates
the sector-specific distinctions in federal information privacy law and blocks the development of
stronger state regulation. That conclusion, though narrow, rests on descriptive and normative
claims with broad implications for the state-federal balance in information privacy law.
Descriptively, Professor Schwartz sees the current information privacy law landscape as the
product of successful experimentation at the state level. That account, in turn, fuels his
normative claims, and in particular his sympathy with theories of competitive federalism. As I
will argue, however, we cannot ignore the federal inputs -judicial and legislative- that shape
significant segments of state information privacy law. The story of information privacy law is
one of federal leadership as well as state experimentation, and we should be wary-whether on
the basis of observable practice or theoretical perspective-of disabling Congress from
articulating and federalizing privacy norms. Moreover, even from the perspective of competitive
federalism, the arguments for federal regulation of information privacy law are stronger than
Professor Schwartz suggests.
A U T H 0 R. Professor of Law and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow, Notre Dame Law School. I
thank A.J. Bellia, Susan Freiwald, Nicole Garnett, John Nagle, and Paul Schwartz for helpful




I. THE VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL DIMENSIONS OF INFORMATION
PRIVACY REGULATION 872
II. STATE-FEDERAL DYNAMICS IN INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 876
A. Quasi-Constitutional Provisions 878
B. "Federal-First" Regulatory Responses 881
C. Federal Provisions Reacting to State Regulatory Activities 881
D. Summary 881
III. INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION AND FEDERALISM THEORY 881
IV. THE FEDERAL ROLE IN INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION 881
CONCLUSION 881
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
In early 2007, as mega-retailer TJX began disclosing details of a massive
network security breach involving at least 45.7 million credit card accounts,'
members of Congress introduced an array of bills promising strong and
comprehensive federal protection of personal data.' Although the iloth
Congress failed to adopt any significant data privacy legislation, let alone any
deserving the labels "strong" or "comprehensive," data security breaches will
keep information privacy issues on federal legislative and regulatory agendas
for the foreseeable future.
Paul Schwartz's provocative essay suggests that Congress should not seek
to adopt a comprehensive federal information privacy law.3 The positive case
for federalization, he argues, is weak: state-level regulation of data privacy is
unlikely to lead to the sort of "race to the bottom" that often justifies federal
regulation in other areas, such as environmental law.4  Moreover, a
comprehensive information privacy law brings the danger of "ossification."'
Particularly if such a law is broadly preemptive of state law efforts, we will lose
the benefit of state experimentation with innovative privacy law protections.6
Schwartz's ultimate conclusion appears to be a narrow one. He argues that
it would be unwise for Congress to impose unitary federal information privacy
rules that both block more stringent state law rules and eliminate the sector-
specific distinctions that now exist in federal law.7 Although I agree with that
1. See, e.g., Ross Kerber, Court Filing in TJX Breach Doubles Toll, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2007,
at Ai (noting discrepancy between TJX's estimate that 45.7 million accounts were affected
and banks' estimate that 94 million accounts were affected).
a. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. S1628 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy). The
various bills include the following: Privacy and Cybercrime Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R.
4175, ioth Cong. (2007); Social Security Account Number Protection Act, S. 12o8, lioth
Cong. (2007); Personal Data Protection Act of 2007, S. 1202, iloth Cong. (2007); Identity
Theft Prevention Act, S. 1178, iioth Cong. (2007); Data Security Act of 2007, H.R. 1685,
noth Cong. (2007); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 11oth Cong. (2007);
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, iloth Cong. (2007); and
Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, iioth Cong. (2007).
3. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2009).
4. Id. at 940.
s. Id. at 928.
6. Id. at 930.
7. Id. at 904 (noting that companies have advocated creation of "a single federal law for the
private sector that would impose uniform standards"); id. at 930 (expressing concern about
a law that would "block new approaches to information privacy in federal and state sectoral
laws").
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narrow conclusion, it rests on descriptive and theoretical premises that have far
broader implications for federal regulation of information privacy. If adoption
of a unitary and truly comprehensive privacy statute is (as I would contend)
unlikely, then we are left with difficult questions about what the relationship
between federal and state law should be and whether there is any role for a
non-sector-specific federal approach to information privacy. Because I disagree
with some of the descriptive and theoretical points that drive Schwartz's
analysis, my views on these questions differ from his in significant ways. In
particular, the case for federal regulation of data privacy is stronger than
Schwartz suggests, even when federal regulation would preempt state law in
favor of a unitary federal standard. In addition, I view carefully crafted
minimum privacy standards that cut across sectoral lines as unproblematic, so
long as such standards permit stronger sector-specific approaches.
My analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, I first seek to separate the
"vertical" and "horizontal" strands of Schwartz's claims -that is, respectively,
those arguments focusing on the federal-state balance in information privacy
regulation and those arguments focusing on the putative scope of a federal
statute in relation to sectoral federal privacy laws. I then briefly discuss the
horizontal issues to identify and put to one side my narrow disagreement with
Schwartz's approach on these questions.
Parts II through IV focus on the vertical dimensions of information privacy
law and explore the key premises, explicit and implicit, upon which Schwartz's
opposition to a federal information privacy law rests. I begin in Part II with the
descriptive claims. Schwartz views states as "especially important laboratories
for innovations in information privacy law,"8 and that view supports his
normative claim that Congress should not adopt a broadly preemptive
information privacy law. 9 While I agree with much of his descriptive account, I
suggest that it may overstate the role of states as engines of experimentation
and change. I then turn in Part III to theories about the proper allocation of
regulatory authority between state and federal authorities. Like many scholars
who consider federalism questions in other areas of the law, Schwartz seems
sympathetic to theories of competitive federalism. Such theories assume that
allowing states and localities to compete for citizens' loyalty by experimenting
with different policy approaches will generate better regulatory outcomes. This
approach and other closely related efficiency-based approaches to allocating
regulatory authority are widespread in existing federalism scholarship. Even if
we accept these efficiency-based perspectives, however, the case for
8. Id. at 916.
9. See id. at 930 (noting the benefits of experimentation).
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federalization of information privacy law is stronger than Schwartz suggests.
Finally, in Part TV, I move beyond the efficiency-based perspectives. Such
perspectives, I argue, cannot explain or justify a number of federal information
privacy statutes that are better understood as efforts to articulate and federalize
privacy expectations. We should not lightly disable the federal government
from playing that role.
I. THE VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL DIMENSIONS OF
INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION
Schwartz argues that it would be a "mistake" for the United States to adopt
"a comprehensive or omnibus federal privacy law for the private sector."" °
Parsing this claim proves more difficult than it first appears, for there are at
least three categories of arguments that one opposing such a privacy law might
raise. First, one might claim that any regulatory intervention -state or
federal-is unnecessary or even counterproductive in light of the possibilities
for market-based responses to privacy and security breaches." Schwartz does
not appear to make this claim, and indeed in other contexts has expressed
skepticism about the adequacy of market responses to data privacy threats. 2
Second, one might focus on the vertical aspects of federal information privacy
regulation. One might accept the need for action by legislatures or regulatory
agencies but conclude that state regulation is preferable to federal regulation;
or one might argue that even though federal intervention itself may be
appropriate, such regulation becomes problematic if it broadly preempts state
law. Schwartz focuses heavily on these vertical dimensions of information
privacy law. Although he specifically opposes a comprehensive and strongly
preemptive federal statute, some of his arguments call into question federal
regulations that are not strongly preemptive of state approaches and federal
regulations that target specific sectors. 3
Third, one might focus on the horizontal features of federal regulation-
that is, the interplay of any federal information privacy law with other
lo. Id. at 904.
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (2008) (arguing that regulators should not preempt efforts of private
actors to distribute losses arising from payment card fraud).
12. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 1o5
MICH. L. REV. 913, 927-28 (2007) (noting that companies may not take adequate data
security precautions because they fail to fully bear the costs of data breaches or precisely
calibrate the costs and benefits of investing in data security).
13. See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
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sector-specific federal rules. One might argue that a comprehensive approach
to regulating the collection, storage, and use of data across varied industries is
inappropriate, even if sector-specific deviations from those rules survive. Or
one could argue that a comprehensive approach is not generally problematic,
but becomes so if it displaces sector-specific rules. Here, Schwartz appears to
be unenthusiastic about any form of comprehensive regulation,14 but especially
opposes regulation that displaces existing sectoral laws."5
In my view, Schwartz's claims about the vertical dimensions of information
privacy offer the most significant challenge to current and future regulations.
Federalism issues are often overlooked in debates over what the privacy law
landscape should look like. I devote most of the remainder of this Essay to
these issues. Before turning to them, however, I note my overall agreement
with much of Schwartz's discussion of the horizontal dimensions of
information privacy regulation, as well as a narrow point of disagreement.
I agree with Schwartz that a horizontally preemptive statute -that is, one
that eliminates any sector-specific privacy approaches -would be problematic
(although the possibility of such a statute being adopted seems rather remote).
First, this approach fails to acknowledge that information privacy interests vary
depending on the type of information at issue. Citizens have different interests
in shielding information depending on how sensitive it is: one has a different
interest in protecting information about one's health than one has in protecting
information about one's shoe purchases. Second, as discussed in Part III, at
least in theory one of the benefits of having multiple regulatory regimes-
whether by state or by sector-is that it permits experimentation with various
regulatory options. Passage of a horizontally preemptive statute does not
eliminate the opportunity for sectoral experimentation, because the obstacles to
a subsequent Congress's enactment of a sector-specific regulation are political
rather than structural. Eliminating sector-specific distinctions, however, does
cut existing experiments short.
My disagreement relates to the question whether it is appropriate for
Congress to adopt any baseline federal information privacy protections while
preserving sectoral protections that exceed the baseline, or to adopt protections
where there are gaps in sector-specific protection. Schwartz acknowledges the
possibility of such baseline or interstitial regulation and considers some of its
advantages, but he fears that adopting a federal baseline violates a principle of
14. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 928 (noting that "the case for and against a federal omnibus law
proves close").
15. Id. at 930.
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"regulatory parsimony.' 6 Schwartz writes approvingly of Congress's caution
in information privacy regulation in the 1970s, when Congress opted not to
enact "a broad regulation of information use that would include the private and
public sectors in one fell swoop."17 To this objection about regulatory
parsimony we might also add another objection that Schwartz raises against
regulations that are both comprehensive and strongly preemptive-that such
regulations will lead to "ossification." 8 Schwartz fears that broad federal data
privacy legislation would be unamendable. The law's broad scope might make
it less likely that Congress would want to revisit it and unravel the
compromises it may reflect, even in response to significant changes in
technology.
I do not understand Schwartz's regulatory parsimony principle simply to
reflect skepticism about the appropriateness of governmental rather than
market-based responses to information privacy problems. Rather, I understand
it to reflect a preference for a nuanced rather than one-size-fits-all approach. Of
course, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) already has made a substantial
move down the path of baseline regulation in critically important areas of
information privacy, including the creation of data security standards, through
use of its authority to regulate unfair trade practices.1 9 One could reasonably
argue that congressional attention to this question would be preferable to the
FTC's broad interpretation of its authority. And baseline or interstitial
regulation, whether by statutory or administrative action, is not inconsistent
with more nuanced sector-specific regulation. On the merits, moreover,
substantial consolidation in information privacy regulation would be a
welcome development. As Schwartz acknowledges, technological convergence
itself provides a compelling reason for consolidation.2" More generally,
information privacy law is replete with distinctions that are formal rather than
functional. To take one example, consider the Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988 (VPPA), which prohibits one who rents, sells, or delivers "prerecorded
video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials" from disclosing
information on what materials a customer has acquired.2' A different statute,
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, governs a cable operator's
disclosure of cable viewing records-records that are functionally similar to
16. Id. at 913, 928.
17. Id. at 913 .
is. Id. at 928.
19. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
2o. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 923-24.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
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those covered by the VPPA.22 The extent to which the VPPA covers information
on what video content a user views at sitcs such as YouTube is already
controversial. 3 And it is unclear how, if at all, the VPPA might apply to a third
party such as TiVo, which does not provide video content but which has access
to some of a subscriber's recording and viewing information by virtue of the
services associated with use of its digital video recorder. Consider also the
disparate statutory protection of wire communications in the Wiretap Act and
of electronic communications in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA) amendments to that statute, 4 and the disparate statutory
protection of electronic communications in transit and electronic
communications in storage."
22. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (prohibiting cable operators from disclosing
"personally identifiable information concerning any subscriber," subject to certain
exceptions).
23. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103, 20o8 WL 2627388, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
July 2, 20o8). In this case, Viacom sought to compel YouTube and its parent corporation,
Google, to disclose information about the YouTube service, including information from
YouTube's "logging" database. That database contained information on how often
particular videos were viewed, as well as the unique login IDs of the users who watched
them and the Internet protocol (IP) addresses of the users' computers. YouTube and Google
claimed that the VPPA barred them from disclosing the information, but the court
dismissed the VPPA's applicability. The court may have misread the statute to cover only
video tapes. See id. at *5 n.5. The court also characterized the privacy claims as "speculative,"
in part because the login IDs are pseudonymous and IP addresses, without more
information, cannot identify specific users. Id. at *5. The parties later reached an agreement
allowing YouTube to mask user information with anonymous but unique codes before
disclosing the relevant records to Viacom. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-
CV-2103 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2oo8) (stipulation regarding July 1, 20o8 opinion and order).
24. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(1) (20oo & West Supp. 20o8) (enumerating specific
federal felonies and requiring approval of high-level Justice Department officials for
authorization of order intercepting wire communications), with 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (2000)
(omitting such requirements for authorization of an order intercepting electronic
communications). Additionally, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(1O) (2000), which bar the use in
evidence of wire communications, but not electronic communications, obtained in violation
of the Wiretap Act or an order issued under it. For further discussion, see Patricia L. Bellia,
Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1392-93 (2004).
25. For example, for government officials to acquire electronic communications in transit in
connection with a criminal investigation, they must satisfy the Wiretap Act's stringent
requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518. They can compel the production of electronic
communications from a third-party service provider on a lesser showing. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). For discussion of these different requirements, see Patricia L.
Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 137, 153-59 (2007). For an
argument that the acquisition of stored communications should be subject to stringent
requirements akin to those in the Wiretap Act, see Susan Freiwald, First Principles of
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As for ossification, I do not view that phenomenon as being unique to
broad federal statutes. ECPA, for example, proved remarkably resistant to
amendment until after the September ii attacks, despite the fact that it is
sector-specific.26 In any event, the possibility of ossification provides a reason
to ensure, as a matter of institutional design, that ossification will be less likely,
not necessarily a reason to abandon a comprehensive approach. The need for a
legislature to revisit a statute may depend on the mechanisms the statute
provides for the law to develop. To take an example from the surveillance
statutes, the inclusion of a statutory suppression mechanism in the Wiretap
Act27 has led to vastly greater development of the law under that statute than
under the Stored Communications Act, which lacks a statutory suppression
mechanism. 8 Similarly, a statute creating private rights of action may allow for
greater development than one that does not.
In short, while I agree with Schwartz that a federal statute that not only
provides baseline privacy protections but that also eliminates existing sector-
specific protections would be unwise, I am less worried about the baseline or
interstitial approach merely because it is broad. Such a law may be problematic
from the perspective of federalism, but not from the perspective of scope. To
examine this question from another angle, I am not sure that Schwartz would
oppose a baseline state statute on the ground that its broad scope would induce
ossification. If I am right, then we can narrow our focus to the vertical issues
that Schwartz's essay ably raises.
II. STATE-FEDERAL DYNAMICS IN INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
I first consider Schwartz's descriptive account of the relationship between
state and federal information privacy regulations. Although I do not fully
explore the rich detail of the state-federal mix here, it is important to probe a
claim that is at the heart of Schwartz's account: that states are privacy
"innovators." As discussed in the next Part, theories of competitive federalism
Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3, http://stir.stanford.edU/pdf/freiwald-
first-principles.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Institutional Design in Communications Surveillance Law (Oct. 1,
20o8) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(0o)(a) (2000).
z8. See id. § 2708 (providing that "[tlhe remedies and sanctions described in this chapter,"
which do not include a suppression remedy, "are the only judicial remedies and sanctions
for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter"); see also Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of
Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54
HASINGS L.J. 805 (2003).
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assume that leaving states free to regulate information privacy will generate a
market for regulation in which states experiment with various policies in order
to satisfy citizens' preferences.29 Evidence of state innovation in privacy law
might buttress that normative approach and also demonstrate the high costs of
a strongly preemptive statute.
The mere existence of a range of state regulations, however, is not enough
to show the kind or degree of innovation necessary to support that claim,
because focusing on state outputs tends to minimize the important judicial,
federal, and other inputs that can profoundly influence state law. Judicial
rulings, for example, can provide the impetus for federal and state statutory
changes by exposing areas of underregulation. One example of this
phenomenon, discussed in greater detail below, involves the adoption of
federal and then state wiretapping laws in the wake of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment rulings in Berger v. New York3" and Katz v. United States.3
Although state wiretapping laws are widespread, the reactive nature of much of
this legislation detracts from the image of states as innovators.
In other words, if we are to assess the role of states as privacy law
innovators, we must consider the interplay of state and federal developments,
and we must consider both legislative and nonlegislative fora. To facilitate that
analysis, I discuss three regulatory patterns illustrating the dynamic
relationship between state and federal law. I focus in particular on the adoption
of various federal information privacy laws and consider the actions of states
leading up to or following the federal action.32 I do not purport to analyze
systematically the reality of states as privacy law innovators. My analysis, for
instance, leaves to one side both state activity that does not prompt or follow
corresponding federal activity, as well as privacy gaps that neither state law nor
federal law has filled. But simply probing the dynamic relationship between
29. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
30. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. A few caveats are appropriate. First, I do not claim that all federal and state privacy
regulation fits within the three patterns I identify. The patterns I identify are simply useful
to illustrate the interplay between state and federal law. Second, I do not contend that we
can or should view all portions of any given federal statute as illustrating a single pathway to
federalization. Different segments of the same statute may reflect different responses to state
law. Third, in categorizing privacy statutes, I seek to describe the effect of congressional
action rather than what motivates it. That is, my argument is not intended to demonstrate
that we can attribute to Congress as a whole, or. to any particular legislator, the motivation
to follow a particular privacy path. I do use standard tools of statutory interpretation
(including some forms of legislative history) to discern the meaning of particular statutes,
but I make no specific claims about congressional motivation.
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state and federal privacy laws, as I do here, reveals that federal nonregulation
might not necessarily result in the kind and degree of generative state privacy
experimentation that Schwartz appears to contemplate. I will return to the
patterns discussed here when I take up the affirmative case for federalization -
and its limits.
A. Quasi-Constitutional Provisions
In casting states as information privacy innovators, Schwartz focuses
mainly on legislative accomplishments, such as state statutes requiring
notification of data security breaches, statutes restricting the use of social
security numbers, and so on.33 Privacy law's story, of course, begins with the
common law. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's influential article, The
Right to Privacy,3 spawned hundreds of state law cases recognizing privacy
torts that scholar William Prosser subsequently classified into four branches -
intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and
appropriation of name or likeness.35  Schwartz's focus on legislative
developments acknowledges that courts have not readily adapted any of these
branches to activities involving the collection, storage, or transfer of personal
data.
Focusing exclusively on legislative developments, however, risks
overstating the role of states, for it minimizes the role of courts in generating
legislative change. Courts can expose constitutional, statutory, and common
law privacy gaps and identify the constitutional standards to which legislation
must conform. Indeed, some of our most significant federal information
privacy statutes attempt to implement or recalibrate the balance that courts
have arrived at in applying the Fourth Amendment to the conduct of
government agents. When a court applies the Fourth Amendment to
government conduct affecting information privacy, the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of the Commerce Clause gives Congress considerable leeway to
respond by implementing or ratcheting up the judicial standard. 6 In other
33. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 917.
34. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (189o).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §5 6 5 2B-E (1977); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (196o).
36. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (framing the relevant inquiry as whether
Congress has a "rational basis" for concluding that the regulated activities, taken in the
aggregate, affect interstate commerce). In many cases, Congress has explicitly linked the
scope of particular privacy statutes to interstate commerce. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)
(2000) (defining "wire communication"); id. § 2510(12) (defining "electronic
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words, the Commerce Clause permits Congress to reinforce a judicial decision
that Congress believes adequately protects privacy or to overcome a decision
that Congress believes does not, and thereby create a quasi-constitutional form
of criminal procedure.
The Federal Wiretap Act,3 7 for example, responded to a pair of cases the
Supreme Court decided in 1967. In Katz, the Court held that government
agents' use of an electronic device to overhear a suspect's conversation is a
"search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and therefore cannot proceed
without a warrant. 38 During the preceding term, in Berger, the Court had
invalidated a New York statute authorizing wiretapping by local law
enforcement officials.39 Taken together, Katz and Berger rendered government
officials' use of wiretapping and eavesdropping techniques illegal unless
officials satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirements the Court identified.
The Wiretap Act was Congress's response; Congress set by statute the hurdles
for investigators to clear to obtain a judicial order authorizing electronic
surveillance.4"
communication"); id. § 2710(a)(4) (defining "video tape service provider"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000aa(a) (regulating officials' seizure of work product materials held by one who intends
to disseminate a publication "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce"). Even where it
does not, Congress can conclude that personal data is itself a subject of interstate commerce.
See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (accepting the claim that "the personal,
identifying information that the [Driver's Privacy Protection Act] regulates is a thing in
interstate commerce, and that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce
is therefore a proper subject of congressional regulation" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). For an unusually candid acknowledgment of the limits of Congress's power to
protect privacy using its Commerce Clause powers, see S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 92 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 218o, which noted that "the extent of the constitutional
power of Congress to prohibit [the interception of oral communications] is less clear than in
the case of interception of wire communications."
37. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat.
197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)).
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub.
L. No. 95-511 (codified as amended at 5o U.S.C.A. §§ 18ol-1811 (West 2003 & Supp.
20o8)), provides a second example of Congress's attempt to translate the Supreme Court's
reasoning into an information privacy statute. In 1972, in United States v. U. S. District Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment barred
government agents from conducting warrantless electronic surveillance to safeguard
national security, at least when the target was a domestic group lacking any connection to a
foreign power. Id. at 320. Although the Court found the agents' conduct unconstitutional,
the Court acknowledged that Congress could tailor specific statutory requirements to the
peculiarities of national security surveillance without violating the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 322-24. Congress never took up the Supreme Court's invitation to create distinct
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In addition to implementing judicial rulings that limit official conduct,
Congress can itself limit official conduct when courts do not. Consider, for
example, Congress's response to a series of Supreme Court decisions in the late
1970s. In United States v. Miller, the Court ruled that, for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, a depositor has no expectation of privacy in information
and documents he furnishes to his bank to complete his financial transactions,
and that government agents therefore could compel production of such items
without a warrant.4" In the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Congress
generally required that federal agents either use a warrant to gather
information from a target's financial institution or provide the target with
notice and an opportunity to contest a subpoena.42 Similarly, after the Court
concluded in the 1978 case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily that the Fourth and First
Amendments permitted government agents to search the offices of a student
newspaper for evidence of criminal activity, even though there was no evidence
that members of the newspaper staff were themselves involved in that
activity,43 Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act of 198o (PPA). 4 The
statute prohibited government agents, federal and state alike, from searching
or seizing work product and other documentary materials held by a person
"reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate" information to the
public, unless the agents could establish probable cause to believe that the
publisher committed the criminal offense to which the materials relate.4" In
effect, the PPA requires government agents to obtain documentary material by
subpoena, which the publisher can challenge in court and with which the
publisher can comply without government officials intruding on the premises.
Finally, after the Court ruled in Smith v. Maryland that government officials'
use of a "pen register" to detect the number of an outgoing call was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment, 46 Congress set minimum standards for
officials' use of those and similar devices. More specifically, a portion of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) imposed procedural
standards for the use of pen registers as well as "trap and trace devices" (which
are devices to detect the number of an incoming call), requiring officials to
standards for national security surveillance of domestic targets, but it adopted in FISA a
special framework for surveillance of foreign powers or agents of foreign powers.
41. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 3402.
43. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooaa.
45. Id.
46. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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certify to a judge that the information in question is relevant to an ongoing
investigation."
In short, a number of federal information privacy statutes directly respond
to judicial rulings on the contours of permissible official conduct.48 It is
perhaps unsurprising to find the federal government imposing standards for
federal agents' conduct, for that seems a uniquely federal role. Several of the
statutes described above, however, set standards for state officials' conduct,
both where courts have concluded that the Constitution itself imposes some
minimum requirements (as in the case of wiretapping and eavesdropping) and
where courts have concluded that the Constitution imposes no such
requirements (as in the case of the Privacy Protection Act and the pen register
and trap and trace device statute). After Congress acted, a number of states
adopted their own laws regulating similar conduct. In design and detail, many
of the statutes are strikingly similar to the federal laws. Consider, for example,
the number of state laws closely patterned after the Federal Wiretap Act 49 and
47. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, §5 301-302, loo Stat.
1848, 1868-72 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
48. There is, of course, much more to some of these statutes: in both the Wiretap Act and the
pen register and trap and trace statute, Congress also regulated private parties' access to the
information in question. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005). The portions of the statutes restricting official conduct, however, essentially
implement or substitute for constitutional requirements.
49. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3001, -3005 to -3012 (2001 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2401-2412 (2007); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-541 to -5S6 (LexisNexis 2001 &
Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.02-.10 (West 2006); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 803-41
to -49 (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6701 to -6709 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 8o8B.1-.8 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2514 to -2518 (2007); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15:1301-:1312.1 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§§ 1O-4O1 to -411 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 272, § 99 (LexisNexis 2000 &
Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.ol-.2o (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-29-501 to -536 (2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 542.400-.422 (West 2002 & Supp.
2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-271 to -295 (2008); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.410-.515,
20o.61o-.69o (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1 to :11 (LexisNexis 2003
& Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:156A-1 to -26 (West 1985 & Supp. 2008); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-15-02 tO -04 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51-.66 (LexisNexis
2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 176.1-.14 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 133.721-.739 (2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §5 5701-5728 (2000 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 12-5.1-1 to -16 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-30-15 to -145 (Supp. 2007); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-6Ol to -603, 40-6-301 to -310 (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02
(Vernon Supp. 2008); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20 (Vernon Supp. 2008); UTAH
CODEANN. §§ 77-23a-1 to -11 (2008); VA. CODEANN. §§ 19.2-61 to -70 (2008); W. VA. CODE
§§ 62-1D-2 to -i6 (2005 & Supp. 2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.27-.33 (West 2007); WvO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-701 to -712 (2007).
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the pen register and trap and trace device statute. 0 It is difficult to see such
statutes as reflecting significant state innovation and leadership in information
privacy law. That is not to say that the state statutes are identical to one
another or to the federal statutes. In authorizing electronic surveillance
activities by their own officials, for example, states had the opportunity to
choose for which offenses these investigative tools should be available, and in
fact there is a fair amount of variety among the state statutes on this question."1
Overall, however, the examples above tend to demonstrate the importance of
federal leadership in information privacy problems, with the adoption of a
federal statute creating the momentum for adoption of state law. Because it is
hard to imagine what the state legislative landscape would have looked like in
the absence of the significant judicial and federal changes, it is hard to see state
statutes adopted in the wake of the federal statutes as important examples of
independent state innovation.
B. "Federal-First" Regulatory Responses
If the conduct of government officials is not at issue, neither the Federal
Constitution nor most state constitutions provide the backdrop for regulation
of data privacy. 2 Instead, that backdrop includes private arrangements (backed
by the threat of judicial enforcement) and common law rules. When these
mechanisms are inadequate to address particular information privacy
so. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3017; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2430-2434; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 934.31-.34; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 803-44.5 to -44.6; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-
6720 to -6722; IOWA CODE ANN. § 8o8B.lo-.12; KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 22-2525 to -2527; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1313-:1316; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-401 to -05;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.35-.37; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-402 to -403 (2007); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 86-298 to -2100 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 570-B:2 to :5; N.Y. CRiM.
PROC. LAW 7o5.oo-.35 (McKinney 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.3-02 tO -05 (1997);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.76-.77; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 177.1-.5; R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 12-5.2-1 to -5; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-29-10 to -5o (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23-A-
35A-22 to -30 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-13 to -15; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-70.1 to -
70.2; W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-lo; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-8O to -8o6.
51. For examples of the various approaches taken in the state wiretapping and eavesdropping
statutes, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.07; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 803-44; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 8o8B.3; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2515; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1308; MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
&JUD. PROC. § 10-4O6; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.o 5 ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.7; OR.
REV. STAT. § 133.724; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 5 5708; S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-70; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-23a-8; VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-66; W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-8 (2005); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 968.28; and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-705.
52. But see the California Constitution, which does contain an explicit right of privacy. CAL.
CONST. art. i, § i.
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problems, the response can presumably begin at the state level or at the federal
level. Here i consider "federal-first responses," through which Congress
regulates information privacy in the absence of substantial state legislative or
regulatory activity.
Portions of ECPA provide an example. The first title of ECPA grafted
protections against the interception of electronic communications onto the
Federal Wiretap Act, which until then had covered only the interception of
wire and oral communications. s" The second title of ECPA, often referred to as
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), established independent protections
for stored wire and electronic communications.14 Both segments filled
information privacy law gaps that state law largely did not address. The
hearings preceding adoption of ECPA brought to light concerns that existing
law - state and federal - did not adequately protect electronic communications,
as well as concerns that the successful development and adoption of new
communications technologies depended upon public perceptions that
electronic communications were secure from private and governmental
interception."5 Although numerous states had adopted or updated state wiretap
acts in the wake of the Federal Wiretap Act's passage, many of the statutes, like
the Wiretap Act, covered the use of a device to intercept wire and oral
communications. By 1986, Congress had already adopted a federal anti-
hacking statute, s6 but participants in the debates over ECPA did not perceive it
or its emerging state analogues to adequately cover the interception of
electronic communications or the acquisition of stored electronic
communications from a service provider's system.17 Congress passed ECPA
before states could fill the perceived gaps.
53. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § lo, 1oo Stat.
1848, 1848-53.
54. See id. § 201, loo Stat. at 186o, 1860-73.
s5. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559; H.R.
REP. No. 99-647, at 18-19 (1986).
56. Congress passed the initial federal anti-hacking statute in 1984. See Counterfeit Access
Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190. As
initially enacted, the statute protected only a narrow range of computers. Id. 5 2102, 98 Stat.
at 2190-91 (covering computers containing national security information, computers
containing financial data, and computers operated by or on behalf of the government).
s. Congress considered a major amendment to the federal anti-hacking statute at the same
time that it considered ECPA, and the relationship between the statutes was a subject of
concern in the hearings on ECPA. Electronic Communication Privacy: Hearing on S. 1667
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
9 9th Cong. 94-95 (1987) [hereinafter Senate ECPA Hearing]; Electronic Communications
Privacy Act: Hearings on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
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There are other significant examples of Congress stepping into perceived
information privacy gaps. When Congress considered whether to repeal the
Glass-Steagall Act provisions precluding banks from offering investment,
commercial banking, and insurance services, consumer groups urged that
allowing financial institutions to combine these functions would expose
customers' personal information. Although state law presumably could have
responded to this problem, at least in part, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley package
tied the Glass-Steagall Act's repeal to new protections regarding the sharing of
information by financial institutions."s Congress has also acted in the face of
certain highly publicized privacy breaches. In 1988, for example, Congress
passed the VPPA, which limited government and private access to video rental
and purchase records. s9 The Senate Report accompanying the proposed
legislation focused on media coverage of the video rental records of Judge
Robert H. Bork during his failed confirmation hearings.6° Similarly, the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 199461 (DPPA) responded to a series of high-
profile incidents in which state agencies' release of drivers' personal
information led to crime or harassment. Most notable among these incidents
was the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, whose stalker had obtained her
address through a private investigator's request to the California Department
of Motor Vehicles.62
As in the case of the quasi-constitutional statutes, when Congress fills a
perceived information privacy gap before states do so and Congress does not
preempt state legislation, states can adopt their own laws regulating similar
Administration ofJustice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 22-23, 90 (1986). ECPA
evolved to protect communications in connection with the transmission process rather than
general hacking activities. See, e.g., Senate ECPA Hearing, supra, app. 156 & n.*
(summarizing changes between versions of ECPA and indicating that ECPA was intended to
cover storage of communications in connection with the communications process, so as to
eliminate overlap with hacking statutes).
58. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 1O6-102, tit. V, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68Ol-O9 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
59. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. loo-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2710 ) .
60. S. REP. No. lOO-599, at 5 (1988) (noting that a Washington newspaper published a profile
of Judge Bork based on the titles of the 146 movies his family rented from a local video
store).
61. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 300,001, io8 Stat. 1796, 2099
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2721).
62. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. 7924 (1994) (statement of Rep. Moran); 139 CONG. REC. 29,466
(1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer),
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conduct. States, for example, have adopted statutes analogous to the SCA,6 3 the
VPPA, 64 and the DPPA,6 as well as statutes mirroring some aspects of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.6 6 Again, however, the existence of these state
statutes does not necessarily provide strong evidence of independent state
innovation, for in many instances the state statutes appear to stem from the
momentum of and share the design of the federal rules. To be sure, there is
some diversity among state approaches. In my view, what is striking is that so
many of the state statutes share a large federal statutory core, subtracting only
one or two options from the federal menu.
To take the example of the DPPA, some states have adopted statutes that
tweak the federal rules so as to provide greater privacy protection. The federal
statute outlines fourteen categories of permitted disclosures by state motor
vehicle departments of personally identifiable information from motor vehicle
63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 5 2421-2427 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.21 (West
2006); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 803-47.5 to -47.8 (LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. &JUD. PROC. 5 lo-4A-o to -o8 (LexisNexis 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. 55 626A.26-. 34
(West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. 55 2A:156A-27 to -34 (West 1985 & Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 16.04 (Vernon 2003).
64. For statutes tracking the structure of the VPPA, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3251.01-3251.03
(West 2004); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 671-675 (McKinney 1996); and TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-18-2201 to -2205 (2001). See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § io6 (West 2006)
(tying lawfulness of release of certain information to categories in the Federal VPPA). A
handful of states considered video rental privacy bills at the same time as Congress and
enacted those measures slightly before Congress did. See Act To Add Section 1799.3 to the
Civil Code, Relative to Business Records, Sept. 20, 1988, ch. 1050, 1988 Cal. Stat. 3405
(codified at CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1799.3 (West 1998)); Act Concerning Video Tape
Distributors, May 27, 1988, ch. 631, 1988 Md. Laws 4221 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAw 5 3-907 (LexisNexis 2002)); Act Relating to Criminal Offenses-Unlawful
Dissemination of Records, May 27, 1988, ch. 94, 1988 R.I. Pub. Laws 255 (codified at R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-18-32 (2002)).
65. For statutes tracking the structure of the DPPA (albeit with some important differences in
coverage discussed below), see ALAsKA STAT. 5 28.10.505 (20o8); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
S 28-455 (Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14.10 (West Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 21, § 305 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.0712(2) (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-
14-3.5-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., STATE. GOv'T § io-616(p)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 32.091 (West Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 61-11-5Ol to -516 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-2901 to -2912 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 26o:14 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. §5 39:2-3.3 to -3.7 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-43.1 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-33-01 to -10 (2008);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 4501.27 (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1109 (West
2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 802.175-.191 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-49-3.1 (2008); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs 5 32-5-143 to -151 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-15-107 to -25-102 (2004 &
Supp. 2007); and TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 730.OO1-.O16 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2008).
66. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4050-4060 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009).
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records.67 By permitting but not requiring such disclosures, the DPPA
essentially leaves in state hands the choice whether to allow all categories of
disclosure that the federal law permits. Some state statutes track the DPPA but
omit or alter a category. The Federal DPPA, for example, allows state motor
vehicle departments to disclose personal information "[f]or use by any licensed
private investigative agency or licensed security service for any purpose
permitted under this subsection."68 Some states disallow or limit disclosures to
private investigators.6 9 Other states disallow or narrow disclosures that federal
law conditions on the express consent of the subject of the motor vehicle
record. z Similarly, there are state statutes pursuing the general approach of the
VPPA but omitting certain categories of disclosures that federal law would
permit. While the federal statute permits law enforcement officials to compel
production of video rental records after obtaining a court order issued upon a
showing of relevance to any criminal investigation, the Tennessee analogue
requires a warrant or an actual criminal proceeding.71 Unlike the federal
statute, the New York analogue does not permit disclosure of customer names
and addresses for marketing purposes.7z
In short, although there are a wide array of state statutes protecting the
privacy of video rental records and motor vehicle records, many of these
statutes are prompted by and retain the basic structure of federal law, while
reflecting some narrowing of the options that federal law leaves open. On one
view, the statutes demonstrate some degree of state experimentation; on
another, they demonstrate a surprising lack of it. Moreover, although diversity
in state approaches can be valuable in and of itself, the competitive federalism
model seems to expect something more-that such diversity will in turn
generate further changes in state and federal law. Assessing whether state law
has had this generative power would require an empirical assessment that is
beyond the scope of this Essay. For now, the point is simply that the mere
existence of varied state approaches layered over a federal approach does not,
67. 18 U.S.C. 5 27 21(b) (2000).
68. Id. § 2 721(b)(8).
69. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.1o. 5 0 5 (d)(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14.10(0(2); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§39:2-3.4(c)(3).
70. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11), (12), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4 3 .1(b) (disallowing
disclosures permitted by § 27 21(b)(11)), and MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-11-509 (omitting
authority to disclose information for bulk distribution), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:2-
3.4(c)(11) (limiting disclosures for marketing).
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4 7 -18-22o 4 (b)(1)(B), (C) (2001).
72. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 27 10(b)(2), with N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 673 (McKinney 1996 & Supp.
2009).
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without more, provide strong evidence of state privacy innovation unprompted
by federal initiatives.
C. Federal Provisions Reacting to State Regulatory Activities
A third pattern involves the adoption of federal law after substantial state
legislative or regulatory activity has already occurred. In other words, the move
away from the default of private arrangements and state common law is first
made by the states themselves, and federal action responds to that shift.
Although not a traditional privacy statute, the Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM Act)
provides one example.73 By the time Congress passed the statute, many states
had adopted statutes restricting spain e-mail or, through state agencies, had
applied unfair trade practice laws to deceptive forms of spam.74 Congress took
an approach similar to that of many state regulations, by restricting commercial
e-mail sent with the intent to deceive or mislead recipients.75 Congress
included a provision preempting any state regulation "that expressly regulates
the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the extent
that [the regulation] prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a
commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto. ' ' 76 More
recently, in the wake of highly publicized security breaches, states have
imposed notification requirements on companies that experience a data
security breach. California was the first state to adopt such a requirement in
2002,
7 7 and forty-four states have since followed suit.78 Although Congress has
not yet passed data breach notification requirements, several of the federal bills
proposed in the wake of the TJX data spill would do so. There are also signs
that the FTC is more aggressively targeting data security breaches, in effect
73. Pub. L. No. lO8-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (Supp. V 2005)).
Although the CAN-SPAM Act is not centrally concerned with the collection, storage, and
use of personal information, some commentators treat it as a "privacy" statute because
receiving spam is in some sense itself an invasion of privacy or because the statute embodies
the fair information practice strategy of allowing consumers to opt out in some
circumstances.
74. For a summary of state legislation, see SpamLaws.com, State Laws, http://spamiaws.com/
state/index.shtml (last visited Feb. iO, 2009).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 7704.
76. Id. § 7707(b)(1).
77. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.29 (West 1998 & Supp. 2009).
78. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 20o8).
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developing common law data security standards at the federal level.79 Whether
the FTC's action responds to or anticipates state action or reflects concerted
shifts in federal policy is unclear."°
79. The FTC has privacy enforcement authority under a number of specific statutes, including
protections concerning financial privacy, see 15 U.S.C. § 6805 (2000) (granting the FTC
authority to enforce Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requirements as to financial institutions not
subject to the jurisdiction of other federal agencies or state insurance authorities), the
privacy of credit information, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2000 & Supp. V 2005), and the privacy
of personally identifiable information relating to children, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6502
(2000). In other cases, however, the FTC has taken an increasingly broad view of its role
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which empowers the FTC to
investigate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 1S U.S.C.A. S 45
(West 1997 & Supp. 2008).
Beginning in the late 199os, the FTC filed complaints against various companies'
privacy practices on the ground that the companies had violated their own privacy policies -
for example, by breaching promises not to share personally identifiable information with
third parties, see, e.g., Complaint, FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS, 2003 WL
34016434 (D. Mass. July 21, 20oo), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2ooo/o7/
toysmartcomplaint.htm, or by breaching promises to safeguard customers' information, see,
e.g., Complaint at 3, In re Eli Lilly & Co., No. C-4o47, 2001 WL 1712505 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n May 8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo2/os/elilillycmp.htm
(claiming that Eli Lilly and Co. had represented "that it employs measures and takes steps..
. to maintain and protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal information" but that in
fact such representations are false and misleading). The FTC treated breaches of privacy
policies as unfair and deceptive trade practices under section 5 of the FTCA.
More recently, however, the FTC has interpreted section 5 as directly obligating
companies to safeguard such information, whether or not the company's privacy policy
promises that the company will do so. In a complaint involving the TJX data security
breach, for example, the FTC claimed that TJX's failure to employ "reasonable and
appropriate security measures to protect personal information caused or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers that is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers" - the FTC interpretation of
unfairness that Congress codified in 1994. See Complaint at 3, In re The TJX Cos., Inc., No.
072-3055, 2008 WL 903808 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Mar. 27, 20o8), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o723o55/o8o327complaint.pdf. Compare id., with Federal
Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, § 9, Pub. L. No. 103-312, io8 Stat. 1691, 1695
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000)). The FTC did not allege that TJX violated its own
policies or that it violated any specific FTC rules; rather, the FTC apparently viewed the
failure to protect data as an unfair trade practice in and of itself.
8o. The FTC's role in enforcing privacy policies is controversial, and many commentators have
argued that the FTC has been and will continue to be ineffective as a privacy regulator. See,
e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003);
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 16o9, 1637-39
(1999). When the FTC first began investigating privacy practices in the late 199os, some
states acted more aggressively under "little FTC Acts" (that is, state statutes paralleling the
FTCA). For example, the FTC closed an investigation of DoubleClick without charges, see
Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Fin. Practices, Bureau of Consumer
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State-level privacy initiatives are likely to have the most influence on the
shape of federal law when they fill an information privacy gap rather than
following federal action. State laws can provide possible models for federal
regulation. When Congress reacts to substantial state regulatory activity rather
than itself seeking to fill a privacy gap, however, stronger preemption may be
quite tempting. A federal statute can consolidate regulatory gains made by the
states by adopting a rule that has proven successful at the state level. If the goal
is to mimic a successful state regulatory experience, those involved in the
legislative process may perceive strong preemption to be costless, because in
theory Congress is adopting the "best" rule from among a range of rules
already in operation (and the successful state regulatory experience may have
made other states less likely to impose greater standards in any event). In other
cases, preemption will be a key component, if not the chief goal, of the
legislation, where Congress seeks to smooth out regulatory unevenness among
the states.
D. Summary
The discussion above permits some preliminary observations about federal
information privacy regulation, theories of competitive federalism, and
preemption. First, although it would be foolish to deny that states are quite
active in privacy regulation, the volume of state regulation, without more, does
not provide strong evidence of competitive federalism at work or of the costs of
preemption. In some cases, as with quasi-constitutional provisions regulating
official conduct and other cases involving federal-first responses, states simply
mimic or expand upon existing federal regulation, and state regulation is
largely attributable to the momentum of federal regulation. Second, we should
hesitate to generalize about the inappropriateness of strong preemption. In
Prot., Federal Trade Comm'n, to Christine Varney, Counsel for DoubleClick Inc. (Jan. 22,
2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/doubleclick.pdf, whereas a coalition of state
attorneys general prompted DoubleClick to change its privacy policies, see In re
DoubleClick: Agreement Between the Attorneys General of the States of Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, and
Washington and DoubleClick Inc. (Aug. 26, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
media-Center/20o2/aug/aug26ao2-attach.pdf; Press Release, N.Y. State Att'y Gen., Major
Online Advertiser Agrees to Privacy Standards for Online Tracking (Aug. 26, 2002),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2002/aug/aug26a_02.html. Despite the fact that
state attorneys general have aggressively targeted companies' privacy practices in the past,
there is little evidence that states are interpreting their own laws governing unfair and
deceptive practices to cover inadequate security standards. Accordingly, one could argue that
the FTC's approach does reflect a concerted shift in federal policy. On the other hand, the
FTC may be acting in anticipation of aggressive state approaches.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
some cases, strong preemption may simply be the natural outgrowth of the
process of innovation, as Congress seeks to temper perceived overregulation by
states. In other cases, when states follow Congress's lead in implementing
judicial decisions or responding to perceived privacy gaps, strong preemption
in theory forecloses states from experimenting with more stringent privacy
rules. Whether foreclosing state experimentation is good or bad policy,
however, depends not only on the lost benefits of state experimentation-
benefits that may be limited when states simply build upon judicial or federal
responses to perceived underregulation -but also on what might be gained by
a unitary federal approach. The benefits of a unitary approach, if any, will be
context-specific, depending, for example, on the extent to which one state's
policy interferes with another's. The point for now is simply that we cannot
move from the fact of state regulation to a normative prescription for state
regulation. The existence of substantial state regulation of information privacy
does not confirm that competitive federalism is thriving -nor does the fact that
states are often followers of federal action suggest that it is not.
III.INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION AND FEDERALISM THEORY
I now consider more fully Schwartz's normative claims about the relative
roles of the states and the federal government in regulating information
privacy. Schwartz's view that it would be a mistake for Congress to adopt a
comprehensive information privacy regulation is not simply a reaction to the
possible breadth of such a statute. At bottom, that view rests upon the premise
that leaving the lion's share of information privacy regulation in state hands is
preferable to federal intervention. Nor can a preference for state regulation
simply relate to the predicted substance of state versus federal regulations; as
Schwartz recognizes, we cannot predict that different levels of government will
consistently adopt positions that favor or disfavor privacy interests.
81
What, then, are the more general principles about the allocation of state
and federal regulatory authority that should shape information privacy
regulation? Other areas of the law, perhaps most notably environmental law,
feature robust scholarly debates over the appropriate mix of federal, state, and
local regulation. Although Schwartz does not fully engage this literature, he
appears to be sympathetic to at least one of its dominant premises-the
presumption of "decentralization," which holds that regulation should occur at
the state level unless a compelling basis for federal intervention exists. Scholars
81. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 938 ("One cannot be confident in a given policy result reached by
reliance on a federal as opposed to state regulatory process, or vice versa.").
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in other areas of the law tend to evaluate justifications for deviating from this
presumption through the lens of efficiency.8' Schwartz does not explicitly
adopt this approach, but the concept of competitive federalism on which he
relies links back to this literature. As I will argue, even under efficiency-based
approaches, there are strong justifications for federal intervention in
information privacy regulation. My purpose in considering information privacy
regulation through the lens of efficiency is not to embrace this methodology to
the exclusion of others; as discussed in the next Part, efficiency-based
approaches cannot explain or justify a range of federal information privacy
statutes. Rather, it is to establish that even from this limiting perspective, the
predicates for federal intervention are met.
Scholars defend the presumption of decentralization that provides the
starting point for many discussions of federalism on a number of overlapping
grounds. Many scholars argue that the Constitution itself encodes such a
presumption 8, or that such a presumption can be derived from the principle of
"subsidiarity" -that is, the principle that regulation should occur at the lowest
level of government capable of appropriately addressing a particular problem -
and the values of autonomy and self-determination that it supports. 84 Others
link such a presumption to regulatory efficiency, by suggesting that state
experimentation with innovative regulatory approaches will lead to better
outcomes, 8" or that the presumption helps to ensure an equivalence between
the scope of a problem and the jurisdiction of the institution addressing it.86 I
leave the first two grounds to one side, except to say that, in my view, they
cannot fully justify a presumption of decentralization. The enumeration of
federal powers and reservation of powers to the states, without more, does not
help to identify the circumstances in which Congress should forestall use of the
82. For examples of this approach in environmental law scholarship, see Jonathan H. Adler,
Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 134-35 (2005);
Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to
Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536-38 (1997); and Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problem of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-22 (1977). See also C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, i YALE J.
ON REG. 93, 93 (1983) (describing the presumption of decentralization as a "basic precept"
of the Reagan Administration's approach to regulation).
83. See Adler, supra note 82, at 134; Revesz, supra note 82, at 536.
84. See Adler, supra note 82, at 134; see also George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:
Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 338-39
(1994) (discussing the connection between the presumption of decentralization and
subsidiarity).
8s. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 93-96.
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powers it does possess. Similarly, the principle of subsidiarity, at least as
developed in Catholic social thought,8" does not automatically presume the
superiority of decisionmaking at a lower level of a hierarchy. Rather, it suggests
that regulation at the lower level is preferable if such regulation has the capacity
to accomplish the desired objectives," which thus requires some metric for
deciding whether state regulation is adequate.
The efficiency-related justifications figure prominently in the federalism
literature in other areas of the law, and it is worth exploring them in greater
detail. Theories of competitive federalism hold that, as a matter of policy, if not
as a matter of constitutional law, decentralized decisionmaking generally will
yield better decisions. 8' Theorists view state and local governments as
competitors in the market for a mobile citizenry. If mobile citizens can choose
the jurisdiction that best suits their needs, state and local governments will
have incentives to satisfy citizens' preferences.9" The Supreme Court's classic
statement of the values of federalism in Gregory v. Ashcroft focuses in part on
the benefits of market responsiveness:
The federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will
be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes;
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government;
and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in
87. See, e.g., Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum: Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor
(May 15, 1891), in 2 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1878-1903, at 241, 25o-51 para. 36 (Claudia
Carlen ed., 199o); Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical of Pope Pius X1 on
Reconstruction of the Social Order (May 15, 1931), in 3 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903-1939,
supra, at 428 paras. 79-80.
88. See sources cited supra note 87; see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
147 (1980).
89. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1499 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1988). This argument builds upon
Justice Brandeis's observation that a federal system permits states to "try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
go. The classic treatment is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956). For more recent discussions, see, for example, McConnell, supra note 89,
at 1498-99; and Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 5-6 (1995).
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competition for a mobile citizenry. 9'
As noted earlier, Schwartz extensively discusses the perceived virtues of state
experimentation in privacy regulation; his descriptive claims serve in part to
buttress a normative claim about the benefits of competitive federalism.92
Theories about competitive federalism represent only one of the efficiency-
related justifications for a presumption of decentralization. Claims about the
systemic benefits of state experimentation necessarily depend on the view that,
individually, states can adequately address particular regulatory challenges. Of
course, that will not always be the case. Many scholars approaching federalism
questions from the perspective of efficiency would allocate regulatory authority
by determining which level of government has a jurisdictional reach that most
closely matches the scope of the problem to be addressed, on the theory that
efficient regulation occurs only when the regulating entity can fully internalize
the costs and benefits of its policies. 93 In environmental law scholarship, then,
debates over when federal intervention should occur are often debates over
application of this matching principle, with scholars identifying the
circumstances in which states can and cannot internalize the costs or benefits of
a particular policy. In addition, some scholars who advocate a matching
principle to guide the allocation of regulatory responsibilities recognize that
federal regulation may be appropriate for some purely intrastate problems, as
where competition for mobile industries9 4 or special interest distortions 9 will
lead to overly lax standards, although these theoretical bases for recognizing a
failure in the market for regulation are more controversial.
96
91. 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
92. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 916-18, 929-30.
93. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM To IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1-3 (1996); Adler, supra note 82, at 133; Henry N. Butler &
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1996); Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 (1996).
94. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 82, at 1212 ("Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any
individual state or community may .rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high
environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic
development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by
movement of capital to other areas with lower standards.").
95. See Esty, supra note 93, at 597-99.
96. The debate over whether competition for mobile industries causes a "race to the bottom" is
particularly robust. Compare, e.g., Revesz, supra note 82, and Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992), with Kirsten H. Engel, State
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Although the matching principle will usually point toward regulation at the
subfederal level, sometimes it will point to federal intervention. One example
involves the existence of a physical externality, such as air or water pollution,
that spills over from one jurisdiction to another. 97 The state in which the
polluting factory is located does not fully experience the costs of the pollution
or the benefits of limiting it. Because local decisionmakers cannot fully
internalize the benefits of regulatory action and the costs of regulatory inaction,
their regulations will be too lax.
How do these principles apply to information privacy regulation? The
consequences of an information privacy breach obviously do not correspond to
particular physical jurisdictions, and one could argue that data "spills" are
analogous to the sort of cross-border pollution that justifies federal regulation.
The fact that states can regulate data processors' transactions with their own
citizens is likely to temper the problem of underregulation, since states will
internalize the benefits of their policies. Such regulation creates a different
problem, however-that of inconsistent regulations generating compliance
burdens for companies. It is possible for companies to respond by customizing
digital databases of personal information. Whether federal intervention to
eliminate such inconsistencies is justified depends on the significance of the
costs of customization- including not only that of coding the personal
information of clients in particular states so that use of the data is consistent
with the applicable legal rules, but also that of determining which clients reside
in which states.
Moreover, an externality can exist whenever a state's regulation projects
significantly beyond its borders, regardless of whether the regulation directly
conflicts with another state's regulation. Consider, for example, the status of
California's motor vehicle emissions standards before Congress gave the
federal government regulatory authority over air pollution and preempted all
state standards but California's. 9s If California adopts the nation's highest
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to-the-Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
271 (1997), and Esty, supra note 93, and Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but
Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 225 (1997). On the public choice issues, see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REV. 553 (2001).
97. See Stewart, supra note 82, at 1215.
98. See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 208, 81 Star. 485, 499 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(i) (2000)); Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub.
L. No. 89-272, S 202(a), 79 Stat. 992, 992 (1965). The 1965 statute set a regulatory floor for
emissions standards; the 1967 statute gave federal standards preemptive effect over states
that had not yet adopted standards. More specifically, the preemption provision allowed any
state that adopted emission control standards before March 30, 1966, to seek a waiver of
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emissions standards, automobile manufacturers that wish to serve the
California market are forced to produce a car that is compliant with California's
standards. If manufacturers cannot cheaply produce different cars for different
markets, then California's standard becomes a national standard. Because the
manufacturer passes the costs of meeting higher emissions standards to all
customers nationwide, California residents bear only a fraction of the actual
cost of the regulation. California's Online Privacy Protection Act, which took
effect in 2004, presents a similar phenomenon. The statute requires website
operators that collect personally identifiable information from California
residents to "conspicuously post" online privacy policies identifying the
categories of information the operator collects and the third parties with whom
it will share the information.99 Any website seeking to serve a national market
will meet the general requirements of the California standard. The standard
becomes a national, though not a federally adopted, standard, and it may create
externalities even if no other state adopts a conflicting rule. The effect of
California's regulation-if not the very goal-is to raise the website's costs.
Customers nationwide bear these costs, regardless of whether non-California
residents value privacy at the same level as California residents do.
Of course, there is an important distinction between California's emissions
standards and its online privacy requirements. The former has a federal
imprimatur that the latter lacks. By permitting California to maintain higher-
than-federal motor vehicle emissions standards,"' Congress effectively
accepted that others value clean air as highly as Californians do. In the absence
of federal regulation, the signals that Californians' privacy preferences should
predominate are much weaker. At most, those signals consist of the absence of
a congressional response displacing those rules, and possibly courts' failure to
displace the regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause.
To be clear, my argument is not that regulation of privacy policies must be
taken up at the federal level. Congress may conclude that California's standards
are perfectly adequate as a national standard, or that they are so weak as to
reflect already widespread best practices among website operators and
therefore impose minimal compliance costs. My argument is simply that the
nationwide projection of California's regulation provides a sound theoretical
basis for federal involvement even from an efficiency-based perspective.
preemption and impose more stringent standards. 42 U.S.C. § 754 3(b)(i). California was
the only state that met this criterion. See, e.g., Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d
1095, 11oo n.i (D.C. Cit. 1979). The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act permitted other
states to impose California standards as well. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
99. Online Privacy Protection Act of 20o3, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22579 (West 2008).
1oo. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (b)(i); supra note 98.
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IV.THE FEDERAL ROLE IN INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATION
The discussion in Part III of efficiency-based approaches both supplies one
missing link in Schwartz's argument and reveals some tension in it. The
missing link in Schwartz's argument relates to his willingness to accept a range
of information privacy regulation despite the federalism concerns he raises
with a comprehensive and strongly preemptive statute. Schwartz has no
difficulty with sector-specific federal statutes that set a floor and permit stricter
state regulations. Although he objects to a comprehensive regulation that
would set a unitary federal standard and preclude stricter state regulations -a
phenomenon that others (perhaps inaptly) term ceiling preemption"' -he is
apparently willing to accept some sector-specific regulations that set unitary
federal standards. And although he is lukewarm about interstitial or baseline
federal regulation, his objections relate to horizontal issues of scope rather than
vertical issues of federalism.
If the presumption of decentralization is an appropriate analytical starting
point, then we must ask what justifies even floor-preemptive sectoral statutes.
The jurisdictional mismatches that would otherwise exist with respect to a
variety of information privacy problems provide one justification. Were it
otherwise, scholars applying a presumption of decentralization would have to
call not only for Congress not to enact a comprehensive statute, but also for it
to repeal a number of other information privacy laws. Schwartz does not
advocate that course.
The tension arises because -from the perspective of competitive federalism
that Schwartz appears to embrace-nothing distinguishes a collection of
sector-specific laws from a more comprehensive one covering the same ground.
As discussed in Part II, for example, it is not the case that a sectoral law
typically follows state experimentation while a comprehensive one would
precede it. Of course, Schwartz's argument not only distinguishes sectoral laws
from comprehensive ones, it also distinguishes floor-preemptive laws from
ones that establish unitary federal standards. The theory of competitive
federalism he embraces does provide some support for the distinction between
101. Scholars use the term "floor preemption" to refer to the preemption of state regulations
weaker than those in the federal statutes: state regulations can exist above the federal floor
or not at all. The term "ceiling preemption" would accurately describe a federal statute that
set a maximum standard but allowed weaker state regulations. Some scholars use the term
ceiling preemption instead to describe a unitary federal standard that displaces all state
regulation. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1549-55 (2007) (distinguishing floor,
ceiling, and "unitary federal choice" preemption).
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floor-preemptive regulations and unitary federal standards. Floor-preemptive
federal statutes permit the continued state experimentation and diversity that
the theory envisions"0 2 and thus build in the possibility of error correction, by
allowing states to demonstrate in concrete ways. the workability or desirability
of higher standards."0 3 Imposing a unitary federal standard, in contrast,
disables states from demonstrating that federal standards are either too high or
too low. But the theory of competitive federalism is incomplete. Even this
theory presupposes that diversity and experimentalism must sometimes give
way to uniformity or other federal values-the question is in what
circumstances. Yet the competitive federalism approach does not help us to
identify these circumstances; the theory is premised upon the existence of a
market for state and local regulation but it does not supply a means to measure
market failure. In other words, the competitive federalism model suggests a
preference for floor-preemptive statutes over strongly preemptive ones, but it
neither suggests that this preference should be absolute, nor identifies when it
should not apply. And from the vantage point of the matching principle, floor-
preemptive regulations are just as problematic as unitary federal standards.
Just as a too-lax state regulation denies cost-bearers beyond the state's
boundaries access to a desired public good, a too-strict federal regulation forces
those in jurisdictions that might choose to forgo a public good to pay for it.'
0 4
Information privacy law presents another challenge for the presumption of
decentralization and for efficiency-based theories about the allocation of state
and federal authority. Even if the matching principle can justify some sector-
specific statutes, there are a number of federal statutes that are difficult to
justify on such a theory. The VPPA' s and the DPPA °6 provide good examples.
1o2. Such claims (along with claims about state autonomy) underlie scholars' objections to
strong preemption but acceptance of federal regulation in a range of contexts. See, e.g.,
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need To Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L.
REv. 69, 74-75 (2005); Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2135 (2006).
103. Of course, floor preemption limits the marketplace for regulation by permitting only one
form of experimentation- experimentation "up" from the federal standard. Since a floor
preemption provision is most likely to appear in a statute responding to perceived
underregulation by states, this limitation is significant: floor preemption allows states to
demonstrate that the federal statute, though it responds to underregulation, in fact still
underregulates, but it does not allow states to demonstrate the presumptively more likely
phenomenon of federal overregulation.
104. See Esty, supra note 93, at 589 (describing nationally specified drinking-water pollution
controls as an example of this sort of "internality").
1os. 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
io6. Id. § 2721.
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When Congress passed the VPPA and the DPPA, states presumably could have
regulated the brick-and-mortar video rental stores and motor vehicle
departments within their jurisdictions without projecting those regulations in a
way that affected activities elsewhere. The regulations would have applied to
in-state entities and in most cases would have protected state residents." 7
In my view, the reason that such statutes are difficult to justify under
dominant efficiency-based federalism theories is that they reflect a
fundamentally different conception of the federal role in privacy regulation. It
is useful to ask why any government regulation of information privacy is
justified in the first place. There are a number of reasons why market forces
will not produce an optimal level of privacy protection. For one thing, many
privacy harms are difficult to value. While it may be possible to value material
harms flowing from a security breach that ultimately leads to identity theft, it is
more difficult to value the sort of dignitary harms that flow from, for example,
the release of sensitive medical data or even the release of preference-revealing
information. 18 In addition, both in the short term and in the long term, it will
be difficult to predict the consequences of releases of personal data. For
example, it is difficult for data subjects to predict how their data will be
aggregated or how new technologies will allow it to be manipulated in the
future.° 9
The fact that efficiency-based approaches to federal regulation cannot
explain or justify a range of federal information privacy statutes does not
demonstrate that federal regulation of data privacy is a mistake; rather, it
signals the importance of statutes, and in particular the importance of federal
statutes, in generating as well as recognizing privacy expectations. To take the
VPPA as an example, any harms flowing from the release of the video rental
records of Judge Bork's family are difficult to quantify, and similar releases will
have different impacts on different individuals. The VPPA reflects an effort to
acknowledge and federalize a privacy expectation that video rental records are
not a matter of public concern. Similarly, portions of a number of the quasi-
constitutional statutes described earlier reflect efforts to articulate and
federalize privacy expectations. Matters concerning state investigators' access
to journalists' work product, for example, could be dealt with by states'
regulation of their own officials. But the PPA recognizes and federalizes an
107. The matching principle may provide a better justification for the Federal VPPA now than it
did before, since brick-and-mortar video rental stores no longer dominate the video rental
and video sale markets.
loB. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 62 (2003).
iog. See, e.g., id. at 64.
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expectation that procedures less intrusive than a search warrant are
appropriate, not only for federal officials, but for state officials as well." °
Of course, states can and often do seek to perform this same generative
role. California appears to take pride in its leadership role on numerous privacy
issues. As the analysis in Part II showed, however, there are a number of cases
in which federal leadership was crucial to the development of privacy law. Both
in the case of quasi-constitutional statutes and in the case of "federal-first"
responses to privacy law gaps, we see federal leadership in information privacy
laws even where efficiency-based perspectives would suggest that it is
inappropriate. When such statutes are not accompanied by strong preemption,
there seem to be few risks to them from the perspective of federalism. In
theory, they simply place the federal government itself in the marketplace for
regulation and allow states to adopt alternative policies. It is possible that even
without strong preemption, diverse state offerings will not follow in the wake
of the federal statute - that even without preemption, the existence of the
federal statute will make diversity in state regulation less likely than it
otherwise would have been. Whether the absence of state variation from the
federal standard is a problem depends on whether that lack of variation reflects
the fact that the federal approach is a good one, or that the federal statute itself
induces a failure in the marketplace for regulation.
More is needed, of course, to justify strongly preemptive federal statutes,
even when they serve the function of articulating and federalizing privacy
norms. The risk here is that diverse state approaches will be foreclosed, thus
eliminating one possible avenue for "errors" in the federal approach to become
apparent. Of course, maintaining sector-specific variation leaves a different
avenue open. In my view, although strongly preemptive data privacy statutes
should be rare, they will be justified in some cases. Where substantial state
regulation precedes federal regulation, the existence of conflicting schemes may
justify preemption. Even where a federal statute responds to constitutional
underdevelopment or fills a perceived gap before substantial state regulation
can occur, preemption may be justified to prevent such conflicts or to displace a
law that has national consequences but that has not been subject to the national
political process.
CONCLUSION
I find much common ground with Schwartz's views. First, we agree on the
value of experimentation in information privacy law. Second, we agree that a
110. 42 U.S.C. § 200oaa.
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data privacy law that is vertically and horizontally preemptive -that not only
evens out state disparities, but also that removes sector-specific rules-is
undesirable. In my view, however, even within an efficiency-based
framework-the framework perhaps least likely to support federal
intervention -there are justifications for federal action and in some cases even
for strong federal preemption. Strong preemption is unproblematic if the
resulting regulation strikes the right privacy balance; the real concern is that
federal law will be broadly preemptive and will underregulate. I may share that
concern, but I do not view it as a concern about federalism or about the
comprehensiveness of federal regulation. I am not confident that we can credit
state experimentation with privacy successes or that we can blame
federalization for its failures.
I~j
